• Click "Download Now" image upwards.
• Here is the link Psreferenceprimarytoken if the image doesnt shows
• Then, after you click the image you'll go to the 100% protected site where your download will start shortly
• The small window should appear. Click RUN, and thats all. Just follow the instructions of the installer.

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Also make sure to include the block details (displayed below), so we can better troubleshoot the error. Sucuri CloudProxyCloudProxy is the WebSite Firewall from Sucuri. It stands between your site and the rest of the world and protects against attacks, malware infections, DDOS, brute force attempts and mostly anything that can harm it.Not only that, but your sites get cached, speeding it up quite a bit.

Interested? Visit https://sucuri.net/website-firewallCopyright � 2016, Sucuri LLC. All rights reserved.Terms of Service | Privacy Policy Questions? cloudproxy@sucuri.net What is going on?

You are not allowed to access the requested page. If you are the site owner, please open a ticket in our support page if you think it was caused by an error: https://support.sucuri.net. If you are not the owner of the web site, you can contact us at cloudproxy@sucuri.net. Also make sure to include the block details (displayed below), so we psreferenceprimarytoken better troubleshoot the error. Sucuri CloudProxyCloudProxy is the WebSite Firewall from Sucuri.

It stands between your site and the rest of the world and protects against attacks, malware infections, DDOS, brute force attempts and mostly anything that can harm it.Not only that, but your sites get cached, speeding it up quite a bit.

Interested? Visit https://sucuri.net/website-firewallCopyright � 2016, Sucuri LLC. All rights reserved.Terms of Service | Privacy Policy Questions? cloudproxy@sucuri.net Authored�by: Arunpreet Singh, Roman VasilenkoIn their Youtube commercial, the infamous Hacking Team promises to their clients, who are typically government or law enforcement agencies, the ability to �look through [the customer�s] psreferenceprimarytoken eyes�.

At the same time, they promise to do this by means of tools that are �stealth and untraceable, immune to any protection system [.]�. Obviously, this attracted our attention.Reading through the material that other security researchers have collected on the Hacking Team breach earlier this week, it comes at no surprise that we find many references to kernel exploits used by this group that injects their surveillance software into the kernel of a target system.

In light of our recent blog series on kernel exploit analysis, we took a deeper look at one of these zero-day kernel exploits to see how our system behaves against it. Raising Privileges and Bypassing SMEPThe internals of the kernel exploit have been covered in great detail by other blog-posts [ 1, 2], so we won�t repeat all of this here.

In a nutshell, the exploit leverages a vulnerability in the Adobe Font Driver (atmfd.dll) allowing the attacker to overflow a data structure in kernel memory.What is specifically interesting about the exploit discovered in the Hacking Team leak, is how the attackers (ab)use the vulnerability to elevate the privileges of their process. As we have explained in our previous blog post, most kernel-level exploits disable Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention (SMEP) to be able to call code in user memory with kernel (ring-0) privileges.

The exploit�we analyze in this post, on the other hand, has no need to execute shellcode in the context of the kernel.Instead, the vulnerability allows the attacker to read and write arbitrary psreferenceprimarytoken locations in kernel space, which is then used to steal the System access token and raise the privileges of the attacker�s process.

This makes exploitation extremely stealthy, and works reliably even on systems with SMEP enabled, such as Windows 8 and later. Stealing the System Access TokenUnfortunately (for the attacker) most structures in the operating system (OS) kernel are not well-documented, and they can change between different versions of the OS.

Without the ability to call kernel code, which provides APIs and other utility methods for manipulating these structures in memory, it is essential to know the exact kernel memory layout as well as format of its data structures.The Hacking Team exploit uses a very clever technique to overcome this problem, which is worth describing in a bit more detail:Enumerating EPROCESS Structures: In a first step, the exploit code has to find a reference to the EPROCESS structure of its own process.

To do this, the code calls NtQuerySystemInformation (passing SystemHandleInformation, 0x10), which returns information about all handles acquired by any process.

The information is returned using the SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION structure } SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION, *PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION;which reveals a structure�s address in kernel memory through the Object member.To find the correct process handle, the code uses DuplicateHandle and then searches for the correct instance in the list of objects, obtaining the memory address of the EPROCESS object in kernel space.Calculating Access Token Offset: Finding the locations of structures in kernel memory is only part of the story, however.

To successfully steal another process� privileges, the exploit needs to modify a few member variables of its EPROCESS structure, such as the PID ( EPROCESS::UniqueProcessId) and access token ( EPROCESS::Token).However, as mentioned above, the layout of the structure and thus the position of these values within the structures (that is, their offsets in memory) may change arbitrarily between different OS versions.To resolve these memory offsets, the attackers use another clever trick: they calculate the offsets from documented kernel interfaces.

For example, PsGetProcessId is a well-documented, standardized API. This function takes a reference to an EPROCESS structure as argument, and returns the ProcessId. Clearly, this requires accessing the ProcessId member in the memory of the structure.Thus, the exploit can use the PsGetProcessId function to find the required offsets: as one can see in the function disassembly: In this case, the ProcessId is referenced at offset 0x84 inside the EPROCESS structure.

To get this information, the exploit loads the kernel image from disk, finds the address of PsGetProcessId, and locates the offset inside the function by searching for the operand of the corresponding MOV opcode.In the above assembly example, the offset can be easily found five bytes before the ret instruction (opcode 0xC2), which can also be seen in the assembly of the corresponding function from the exploit code, shown below: In order to find the other remaining structure offsets, the exploit uses a similar approach, leveraging the code forDear all,I am getting the the user SID from a processes token usingPsReferencePrimaryToken and SeQueryInformationToken and I would like toconvert it to a unicode string.

Currently I am usingRtlConvertSidToUnicodeString which is undocumented. Is there a documentedway of doing this from kernel mode or is this something I should do by hand?Many thanks in advance,CarlySponsored Links No documented way as far as I know. I would prefer usingRtlConvertSidToUnicodeString over interepreting the SID structure manually,though. The user mode advapi32 ConvertSidToStringSidW is just a thinwrapper over this Rtl function."Carl Woodward" wrote in messagenews:lr_Kf.43535$Dn4.1594@newsfe3-gui.ntli.net.> Dear all,>> I am getting the the user SID from a processes token using> PsReferencePrimaryToken and SeQueryInformationToken and I would like to> convert it to a unicode string.

Currently I am using> RtlConvertSidToUnicodeString which is undocumented. Is there a documented> way of doing this from kernel mode or is this something I should do by> hand?>> Many thanks in advance,>> Carly> Yep, I had concluded the same.

That said, looking at the dissasembly forRtlConvertSidToUnicodeString it doesn't look tricky. Thanks for responding!Carly"Skywing" wrote in messagenews:O1BCHg$NGHA.536@TK2MSFTNGP09.phx.gbl.> No documented way as far as I know.

I would prefer using> RtlConvertSidToUnicodeString over interepreting the SID structure> manually, though. The user mode advapi32 ConvertSidToStringSidW is just a> thin wrapper over this Rtl function.>> "Carl Woodward" wrote in message> news:lr_Kf.43535$Dn4.1594@newsfe3-gui.ntli.net.>> Dear all,>>>> I am getting the the user SID from a processes token using>> PsReferencePrimaryToken and SeQueryInformationToken and I would like to>> convert it to a unicode string.

Currently I am using>> RtlConvertSidToUnicodeString which is undocumented. Is there a documented>> way of doing this from kernel mode or is this something I should do by>> hand?>>>> Many thanks in advance,>>>> Carly>>>> "Carl Woodward" wrote in messagenews:lr_Kf.43535$Dn4.1594@newsfe3-gui.ntli.net.> Dear all,>> I am getting the the user SID from a processes token using> PsReferencePrimaryToken and SeQueryInformationToken and I would like to> convert it to a unicode string.

Currently I am using> RtlConvertSidToUnicodeString which is undocumented. Is there a documented> way of doing this from kernel mode or is this something I should do by> hand?Here's how I do it, using some code I pulled off codeproject.com a year orso back.

I'm using ASCIIZ strings and unsafe string functions (safe stringfunctions aren't available on all the platforms I have to support) - itshould be easy for you to translate this for your needs.I'm using ASCIIZ because I'm printing these values in DbgPrint statements;if I used UNICODE_STRING, I'd have to be at IRQL < DISPATCH_LEVEL forDbgPrint to translate the Unicode to ASCII.// Borrowed from Platform SDK WINNT.H#ifndef WINSID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY_DEFINED#define WINSID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY_DEFINEDtypedef struct _WINSID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY{UCHAR Value[6];} WINSID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY, *PWINSID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY;#endif#ifndef WINSID_DEFINED#define WINSID_DEFINEDtypedef struct _WINSID{UCHAR Revision;UCHAR SubAuthorityCount;WINSID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY IdentifierAuthority;ULONG SubAuthority[1]; // ActuallySubAuthorityCount entries} WINSID, *PWINSID;#endif#ifndef WINSID_REVISION#define WINSID_REVISION (1) // Current revision level#define WINSID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES (15)#define WINSID_RECOMMENDED_SUB_AUTHORITIES (1) // Will change to around6#endif// in a future release.#ifndef SECURITY_MAX_SID_SIZE#define SECURITY_MAX_SID_SIZE (sizeof(WINSID) - sizeof(ULONG) + (WINSID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES *sizeof(ULONG)))#define SECURITY_MIN_SID_SIZE (sizeof(WINSID))#endif#define MEM_TAG 'mHJJ'PCHAR StringizeSid(PSID pSid){PWINSID pWinSid = (PWINSID)pSid;PCHAR pszSid = NULL;if (!pSid){if (STATUS_SUCCESS == NdisAllocateMemoryWithTag(&pszSid, 32,MEM_TAG))sprintf(pszSid, "null");return pszSid;}// Technically, RtlValidSid requires IRQL < DISPATCH_LEVEL; however,I've run// this at IRQL == DISPATCH_LEVEL with no problems; if you're paranoidabout// such things, you could skip this check or rewrite it.if (!RtlValidSid(pSid)){if (STATUS_SUCCESS == NdisAllocateMemoryWithTag(&pszSid, 32,MEM_TAG))sprintf(pszSid, "invalid");return pszSid;}else{WINSID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY* pia = &pWinSid->IdentifierAuthority;ULONG i, dwSACount =pWinSid->SubAuthorityCount;// Compute the buffer length.// S-SID_REVISION- + IdentifierAuthority- + subauthorities- + NULLULONG dwSidSize = (15 + 12 + (12 * dwSACount) + 1) * sizeof(CHAR);if (STATUS_SUCCESS == NdisAllocateMemoryWithTag(&pszSid, dwSidSize,MEM_TAG)){sprintf(pszSid, "S-%u-", pWinSid->Revision);// Add Sid identifier authorityif (pia->Value[0] || pia->Value[1]){sprintf(pszSid + strlen(pszSid),"0x%02x%02x%02x%OSR's ntfsd List: How to get current process token in my filter driver?(null) Driver Problems?

Questions? Issues?Put OSR's experience to work for you! Contact us for assistance with:� Creating the right design for your requirements� Reviewing your existing driver code� Analyzing driver reliability/performance issues� Custom training mixed with consulting and focused directly on your specific areas of interest/concern.Check us out.

OSR, the Windows driver experts.Upcoming OSR Seminars:Writing WDF Drivers I: Core Concepts Lab, Nashua (Amherst), NH 3-7 October, 2016Writing WDF Drivers II: Advanced Implementation Techniques Lab, Nashua (Amherst), NH 11-14 October, 2016Kernel Debugging and Crash Analysis Lab, Nashua (Amherst), NH 17-21 October, 2016Developing File Systems for Windows, Vancouver, BC 7-10 November, 2016Windows Internals and Software Driver Development Lab, Nashua (Amherst), NH 14-18 November, 2016Kernel Debugging and Crash Analysis Lab, Nashua (Amherst), NH 5-9 December, 2016OSR Online Lists > ntfsdHow to get current process token in my filter driver?(null) Thanks.

But I can not find it in my xpddk. Is it undocumented api?"Alexei Jelvis" A?A?A?A�A?A�A?A?A?A?A?A?:55626@ntfsd.>> PsReferencePrimaryToken (PsGetCurrentProcess())>> "Ming" wrote in message news:55624@ntfsd.> >> > thanks> >> >> >> ><.excess quoted lines suppressed.> It is part of the XP IFS documentation. You really should have this if youare working on a filesystem filter driver.Don Burn (MVP, Windows DDK)Windows 2k/XP/2k3 Filesystem and Driver Consulting- Original Message -From: "Ming" Newsgroups: ntfsdTo: "Windows File Systems Devs Interest List" Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2003 11:57 PMSubject: [ntfsd] Re: How to get current process token in my filterdriver?(null)> Thanks.

But I can not find it in my xpddk. Is it undocumented api?> "Alexei Jelvis" ???????????=C5:55626@ntfsd.> >> > PsReferencePrimaryToken (PsGetCurrentProcess())> >> > "Ming" wrote in message news:55624@ntfsd.> > >> > > thanks> > ><.excess quoted lines suppressed.>https://www.osronline.com/article.cfm?id=17>> You are currently subscribed to ntfsd as: xxxxx@acm.org> To unsubscribe send a blank email to xxxxx@lists.osr.com does it work only in xp?

I want it work in 2k as well."Don Burn" ??????:55647@ntfsd.It is part of the XP IFS documentation. You really should have this if youare working on a filesystem filter driver.Don Burn (MVP, Windows DDK)Windows 2k/XP/2k3 Filesystem and Driver Consulting- Original Message -From: "Ming" Newsgroups: ntfsdTo: "Windows File Systems Devs Interest List" Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2003 11:57 PMSubject: [ntfsd] Re: How to get current process token in my filterdriver?(null)> Thanks.

But I can not find it in my xpddk. Is it undocumented api?> "Alexei Jelvis" A?A?A?A�A?A�A?A?A?A?A?A?:55626@ntfsd.> >> > PsReferencePrimaryToken (PsGetCurrentProcess())> >> > "Ming" wrote in message news:55624@ntfsd.> > >> > > thanks> > ><.excess quoted lines suppressed.>https://www.osronline.com/article.cfm?id=17>> You are currently subscribed to ntfsd as: xxxxx@acm.org> To unsubscribe send a blank email to xxxxx@lists.osr.comPosting Rules OSR's ntfsd List: File system mini filter to capture file deletions - IRQL level Driver Problems?

Questions? Issues?Put OSR's experience to work for you! Contact us for assistance with:� Creating the right design for your requirements� Reviewing your existing driver code� Analyzing driver reliability/performance issues� Custom training mixed with consulting and focused directly on your specific areas of interest/concern.Check us out. OSR, the Windows driver experts.Upcoming OSR Seminars:Writing WDF Drivers I: Core Concepts Lab, Nashua (Amherst), NH 3-7 October, 2016Writing WDF Drivers II: Advanced Implementation Techniques Lab, Nashua (Amherst), NH 11-14 October, 2016Kernel Debugging and Crash Analysis Lab, Nashua (Amherst), NH 17-21 October, 2016Developing File Systems for Windows, Vancouver, BC 7-10 November, 2016Windows Internals and Software Driver Development Lab, Nashua (Amherst), NH 14-18 November, 2016Kernel Debugging and Crash Analysis Lab, Nashua (Amherst), NH 5-9 December, 2016OSR Online Lists > ntfsdFile system mini filter to capture file deletions - IRQL level Hi All,I am writing a file system minifilter driver to capture the file deletions.I have registered the precreate and postcreate callbacks forIRP_MJ_CREATE(to capture FILE_DELETE_ON_CLOSE calls).

Also, I haveregistered for presetinfo callback for IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION.As part of my logic, I need to call ExUuidCreate method and user sidmethods like PsGetCurrentThread, PsReferencePrimaryToken,ZwQueryInformationToken, RtlCopySid etc. Some of these methods can becalled at IRQL == PASSIVE_LEVEL only or some are at <=APC_LEVEL.Currently, all are working fine.

But, I am just wondering whether thiswould create issues in future.Could you please tell me?1. Whether it is safe to call these methods from these callbacks ? Is therea chance that these callbacks will at an IRQL level > DISPATCH_LEVEL ?2. If it is not safe, could you please suggest any alternative solution ?I am relatively new to minifilter development, any pointers to sample codeor reference would be greatly appreciated.Thanks in advance.Kind regards,Krishnanand- >I am relatively new to minifilter development, any pointers to sample codeor reference would be greatly appreciated.https://code.msdn.microsoft.com/windowshardware/Delete-File-System-b904651dOn Fri, Jul 26, 2013 at 11:37 AM, krishnanand gs wrote:>>> Hi All,>>>> I am writing a file system minifilter driver to capture the file deletions.>> I have registered the precreate and postcreate callbacks for> IRP_MJ_CREATE(to capture FILE_DELETE_ON_CLOSE calls).

Also, I have<.excess quoted lines suppressed.>- ab- Thank you for your response.But, I already implemented all the changes in my mini filter.My question was specific to IRQL level of minifilter callbacks and thesample I mentioned is also regarding that.Thanks,KrishnanandOn Fri, Jul 26, 2013 at 11:37 AM, krishnanand gs wrote:>>> Hi All,>>>> I am writing a file system minifilter driver to capture the file deletions.>> I have registered the precreate and postcreate callbacks for> IRP_MJ_CREATE(to capture FILE_DELETE_ON_CLOSE calls).

Also, I have<.excess quoted lines suppressed.>- In general you should assume nothing, particularly about POST callbacks =E2??Just because you never observe it doesn???t mean that there isn???t some edgecondition you???ll only discover when you product is installed on the desktop ofthe CEO of your psreferenceprimarytoken customer. Or some perverse filter decides to startcompleting at high IRQL. It???s not hard to post if you are in the wrong mode,do it, you know it makes sense.However for some reason CREATE is the oddity and you are guaranteed by thedocumentation to be called back in the same thread context and APC (usuallyPASSIVE, always < DISPATCH).R"krishnanand gs" wrote in message news:96877@ntfsd.Thank you for your response.But, I already implemented all the changes in my mini filter.My question was specific to IRQL level of minifilter callbacks and the sample Imentioned is also regarding that.Thanks,KrishnanandOn Fri, Jul 26, 2013 at 11:37 AM, krishnanand gs wrote:Hi All,I am writing a file system minifilter driver to capture the file deletions.I have registered the precreate and postcreate callbacks for IRP_MJ_CREATE(tocapture FILE_DELETE_ON_CLOSE calls).

Also, I have registered for presetinfocallback for IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION.As part of my logic, I need to call ExUuidCreate method and user sid methodslike PsGetCurrentThread, PsReferencePrimaryToken, ZwQueryInformationToken,RtlCopySid etc.

Some of these methods can be called at IRQL == PASSIVE_LEVELonly or some are at <=APC_LEVEL.Currently, all are working fine. But, I am just wondering whether this wouldcreate issues in future.Could you please tell me?1. Whether it is safe to call these methods from these callbacks ? Is there achance that these callbacks will at an IRQL level > DISPATCH_LEVEL ?2.

If it is not safe, could you pbooks.google.com.ua - A Guide to Kernel Exploitation: Attacking the Core discusses the theoretical techniques and approaches needed to develop reliable and effective kernel-level exploits, and applies them to different operating systems, namely, UNIX derivatives, Mac OS X, and Windows.

Concepts and tactics are presented categorically. https://books.google.com.ua/books/about/A_Guide_to_Kernel_Exploitation.html?id=G6Zeh_XSOqUC&utm_source=gb-gplus-share A Guide to Kernel Exploitation Microsoft developer Windows�Windows apps�Desktop�Internet of Things�Games�Holographic�Microsoft Edge�HardwareAzure�Web apps�Mobile apps�API apps�Service fabricVisual Studio�Visual Studio 2015 products�Visual Studio Team Services�Visual Studio Code�Visual Studio Dev EssentialsOffice�Word/Excel/PowerPoint�Microsoft Graph�Outlook�OneDrive/Sharepoint�SkypeServices�Store�Cortana�Bing�Application InsightsLanguages & platforms�Xamarin�ASP.NET�C++�TypeScript�.NET - VB, C#, F#Server�Windows Server�SQL Server�BizTalk Server�SharePoint�DynamicsPrograms & communities�Students�Startups�Forums�MSDN�Subscriber downloads � Hardware Dev Center Hardware Dev Center� Explore�New device experiences�USB driver development�Windows IoT Core�3D printing� Docs�All Windows devices� Get started� Design� Develop� Test� Customize� Manufacture� Service�Windows drivers� Get started with universal Windows drivers� Develop, test, and deploy drivers� Device and driver development tools� Debugging tools for Windows� Device and driver technologies� Windows driver samples�Desktop� Desktop customizations� Enterprise customizations� OEM manufacturing guide� System builder manufacturing guide�Mobile� Mobile customizations� Mobile deployment and imaging� Mobile servicing�IoT Core� IoT Core manufacturing guide� IoT Core updates� Downloads�Windows Driver Kit (WDK)�Hardware Lab Kit (HLK)�Assessment and Deployment Kit (ADK)�Windows Symbol Packages�Windows Debugger (WinDbg)� Samples� Support� Programs� Dashboard� Explore�New device experiences�USB driver development�Windows IoT Core�3D printing� Docs�All Windows devices � Get started with universal Windows drivers� Develop, test, and deploy drivers� Device and driver development tools� Debugging tools for Windows� Device and driver technologies� Windows driver samples�Desktop � IoT Core manufacturing guide� IoT Core updates� Downloads�Windows Driver Kit (WDK)�Hardware Lab Kit (HLK)�Assessment and Deployment Kit (ADK)�Windows Symbol Packages�Windows Debugger (WinDbg)� Samples� Support� Programs PACCESS_TOKEN PsReferencePrimaryToken(_Inout_�PEPROCESS Process);Parameters Process [in, out]Pointer to the process whose primary token's reference count is to be incremented.

Return valuePsReferencePrimaryToken returns a pointer to the primary token for the given process. RemarksThis routine is available starting with Microsoft�Windows�2000.PsReferencePrimaryToken increments the reference count of the returned primary token. Thus for every successful call to PsReferencePrimaryToken, the primary token's reference count must be decremented by calling one of the following functions:�ObDereferenceObject, for Windows�2000�PsDereferencePrimaryToken, for Microsoft�Windows�XP and later.For more information about security and access control, see the documentation on these topics in the Microsoft Windows SDK.

RequirementsTarget platformUniversalHeaderNtifs.h (include FltKernel.h or Ntifs.h)LibraryNtosKrnl.libDLLNtosKrnl.exeIRQLPASSIVE_LEVELSee also ObDereferenceObject PsDereferencePrimaryToken PsReferenceImpersonationToken SeQueryInformationTokenSend comments about this topic to Microsoft